Fred Branfman: Obama's Secret Wars: How Our Shady Counter-Terrorism Policies Are More Dangerous Than Terrorism

By Fred Branfman, AlterNet
Posted on July 11, 2011, Printed on July 13, 2011
http://www.alternet.org/story/151596/obama%27s_secret_wars%3A_how_our_shady_counter-terrorism_policies_are_more_dangerous_than_terrorism

Although President's Obama's partial Afghan troop withdrawal announcement has received more attention, his June 29 "National Strategy for Counterterrorism" is of far greater long-term significance. This remarkable document states that the U.S. government intends to "disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents," in the following "areas of focus": "The Homeland, South Asia, Arabian Peninsula, East Africa,Europe, Iraq, Maghreb and Sahel, Southeast Asia (and) Central Asia." 

This assassination strategy is already operational in six Muslim countries with a combined population of 280 million: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and Libya, which has become a laboratory experiment for urban drone assassinations. The London Sunday Times reported a year ago that "President Obama has secretly sanctioned a huge increase in the number of US special forces ... with American troops now operating in 75 countries." There are presently 60,000 Special Operations forces worldwide, with 7,000 U.S. assassins unleashed upon Afghanistan and 3,000 in Iraq. Lt.-Col. John Nagle (ret.), an enthusiastic assassination supporter, has correctly called these operations "an almost industrial-scale counterterrorism killing machine."

Obama vs. Petraeus in 2012

President Obama, a former constitutional law lecturer, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and rhetorical advocate of the Rule of Law cannot possibly reconcile his previously stated beliefs with his presently creation of an "industrial-size killing machine" that sees U.S. leaders unilaterally hunt, kidnap and murder any person anywhere on earth -- including "the Homeland" -- whenever they feel like it, without outside oversight or their victims enjoying any legal or human rights whatsoever. Whatever his personal beliefs at this point, the president likely hopes that this "counterrorism strategy" will help protect him from inevitable Republican attempts to blame him during the 2012 presidential campaign for the likely losses the U.S. will sustain in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and elsewhere in the next 16 months. And normally principled liberal supporters like the Center for American Progress, which called the strategy "more efficent counterterrorism," may well have made the same calculation.

But this "counterterrorism" program not only formalizes extrajudicial state killing formerly associated in the public mind only with the Gestapo and KGB. It also drastically weakens, not strengthens, U.S. national security. The U.S. is bedeviled today precisely because previous presidents created long-term disasters by making disastrous short-term political decisions -- steadily escalating in Indochina to avoid defeat before the next election, creating al-Qaeda and allowing Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq to acquire nuclear weapons in the name of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, arming the Shah of Iran and then arming Saddam Hussein against Iran after the Shah fell.

It is true that America badly needs an alternative to occupying foreign lands. But a worldwide assassination program that motivates countless potential suicide bombers, weakens friendly governments, strengthens U.S. foes and increases the danger of nuclear materials falling into the hands of anti-Americanterrorists, is hardly more "cost-effective counterterrorism." On the contrary. It exponentially increases America's enemies while doing them comparatively little damage.

David Petraeus claimed success for his "counterinsurgency surge" in Iraq on the grounds that it reduced violence there. He has thus failed in Afghanistan by his own criteria, since his "counterterror surge" has seen violence increase by 51 percent over a year ago according to the U.N., and in Pakistan where militant activity has increased by more than 400 percent since he expanded U.S. war-making there after becoming Centcom commander.

Despite this, newly appointed CIA Chief Petraeus has now been tasked with expanding his failed counterterror policies worldwide. He will seek to integrate military and CIA assassination capabilities; vastly increase and make more deadly a drone airforce, both that of the CIA and a U.S. Airforce which alone plans to quadruple its drone force and now "trains more pilots to operate drones than to fly bombers or fighter jets"; and he will increase the numbers and geographic scope of 60,000 Special Operations assassins and their backup support.

Besides the state of the economy, the 2012 presidential election may well hinge on whom the public blames more for the losses likely to occur in the next 18 months in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Republicans are already blaming Obama, using Petraeus's manifest disloyalty to his Commander-in-Chief when he criticized Obama's partial Afghan troop withdrawal. It may well be that Obama's reelection will depend on the public learning the truth: that U.S. losses in the "AfPak theater" are due to Petraeus' reckless and irresponsible expansion of U.S. war-making into Pakistan after becoming Centcom Commander in the fall of 2009, and his failed shift from "counterinsurgency" to "counterterrorism" after taking over in Afghanistan in September 2010.

The truth is that Obama has been listening to his "Commanders in the field" for 30 months now, as the Republicans have demanded, and they have failed him. If Obama does lose the 2012 election because of the military's failures, he will have only himself to blame. Previous U.S. presidents, from Abraham Lincoln to Harry Truman, gained political strength by risking cashiering incompetent military officers. By promoting Petraeus, Obama has placed himself in a no-win situation, inextricably binding himself -- and his nation -- to the general's countless reckless misjudgements, strategic failures and such manipulations of the media as his recent false claim to have reduced violence 5 percent in Afghanistan.

Two months after David Petraeus' fateful decision to unleash "counter-terror" in southern Afghanistan, the international press (it was ignored in the U.S.) reported that the floor of Kandahar's only hospital was "on some days, filled with blood", and civilian casualties so exceeded its capacity that sick patients had to be transported to Pakistan for medical help. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, close ally Britain's Special Representative to Afghanistan, stated that David Petraeus should be "ashamed of himself," explaining that "he has increased the violence (and) trebled the number of special forces raids." 

"For Every Dead Pashtun Warrior, There Will Be 10 Pledged to Revenge."

Obama counterterrorism advisor John Brennan sought to package Obama's strategy as consisting of only surgical strikes on known al-Qaeda leaders, making the delusional and fanatic claim that in the last year “there hasn't been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities that we've been able to develop.” In fact, Reuters reported 13 months ago that "the CIA received approval to target ... a wider range of targets in Pakistan's tribal areas ... in many, if not most cases, the CIA had little information about the foot soldiers killed in the strikes." The evidence clearly indicates that the U.S. has since conducted hundreds of strikes in Pakistan without knowing how many civilians were among the 1900 people it has murdered -- only 56 of whom were named as "al Qaeda and Taliban Leaders" by the strongly pro-drone Long War Journal.

If manned helicopter strikes in the middle of Baghdad, with pilots hovering over and discussing their targets, can murder a Reuters journalist for carrying a camera and a doctor trying to rescue him -- as revealed in the Wikileaks "Collateral Murder" video -- one can only imagine the drone-caused civilian carnage in remote areas of both Pakistan and Afghanistan that are inaccessible to the outside world.

The mentality behind counterrorism has been described by former head of the CIA Counterterrorism Center in 2005-6, Robert Grenier as "kill them before they kill you" -- a primitive law of the jungle mentality more appropriate to organized crime than a superpower which confronts a 1.8 billion strong Muslim world in which, for each of "them" the U.S. kills it creates exponentially more of "them" committed to killing "us."

This strategy is thus not only immoral and illegal, but poses a clear and present danger to U.S. national security. In return for killing a handful of "al-Qaeda leaders" it dramatically increases the ranks of potential anti-U.S. suicide bombers, weakens friendly governments, strengthens U.S. foes, and increases the risk of nuclear materials falling into unfriendly hands. Its basic premise -- that there is a fixed quantity of "al-Qaeda leaders, adherents and affiliates" whose death reduces the threat to the U.S. -- is simply wrong. As Cowper-Coles has explained, "for every dead Pashtun warrior, there will be 10 pledged to revenge." Former CIA counterrorism operative Michael Scheuer has stated that "Petraeus's 'decapitation' approach was also unlikely to work. 'The Red Army tried that for 10 years, and they were far more ruthless and cruel about it than us, and it didn't work so well for them.'"

Does it really make sense to kill a handful of top leaders, who can be easily replaced by often more competent deputies, at the cost of motivating entire populations to support killing Americans? 

The latest example is Yemen where, the Washington Post has reported,"attacks on electricity plants and oil pipelines have left Yemen's economy on the edge of collapse, with the most damaging strike carried out in retaliation for a U.S. counterterrorism raid." After the U.S. assassinated a tribal chief's innocent son, he retaliated by cutting Yemen's main oil pipeline. By aiding Yemen's economic collapse, U.S. counterterrorism is increasing support for terrorism.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Pakistani militants focused almost entirely on their immediate surroundings. But now, as a result of U.S. war-making in Pakistan, former CIA counterterrorism chief Grenier has explained that "it's not just a matter of numbers of militants who are operating in that area, it also effects the motivations of those militants ... They now see themselves as part of a global Jihad. They are not just focused on helping oppressed Muslims in Kashmir or trying to fight the NATO and the Americans in Afghanistan, they see themselves as part of a global struggle, and therefore are a much broader threat than they were previously. So in a sense, yes, we have helped to bring about the situation that we most fear." 

U.S. Policy Increasing The Nuclear Danger in Pakistan

In the wake of Osama Bin-Laden's murder, Congress, the media and pundits have finally begun to awaken to the fact that, as John Kerry recently stated, "in many ways, the Afghanistan war is a sideshow to the main event, if you will, that is next door." But officials and pundits blame the problems in Pakistan entirely on a "Pakistani military (which views) the United States as a hostile force trying to perpetuate a state of `controlled chaos' in Pakistan and determined to `denuclearize' the regime," as Fareed Zakaria recently wrote. None have had the intellectual courage to admit that, given the paranoia and incompetence of Pakistan's leaders, U.S. "counterterrorism" policy has made the situation infinitely worse.

The current attempt to blackmail "main event" Pakistan into supporting U.S. military efforts in "sideshow" Afghanistan by withholding $800 million in military aid is only the latest example of the incoherence of present U.S. policy, and strengthens the case - as discussed below - for shifting to a focus on economic and social aid.

Pakistan has in many ways been a laboratory for counterterrorism, and U.S. experience there proves conclusively that any successes it has enjoyed are far outweighed by its failures. President Obama stated in his Afghan withdrawal speech that "together with the Pakistanis, we have taken out more than half of al-Qaida's leadership."

But, as I have been warning for two years now, the failures of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Pakistan are so great that it is madness to extend this failed policy to the entire Muslim world. U.S. counter-terror policy in Pakistan has contributed to:

-- A vast increase in overall militant strength: While U.S. officials claim drone strikes are hurting Pakistani militants in tribal areas, in fact the Federation of American Scientists reports that "in less than a decade Pakistan has witnessed terror incidents increase almost fifty-fold." Though the CIA quintupled drone strikes in Pakistan to an annual average of 79 in 2009-10 from16 in 2004-8, it has not reduced violence. On the contrary, incidents of reported terrorism in Pakistan have quadrupled from an annual 2004-8 average of 470 to a 2009-10 annual average of 1723, with the number and seriousness of attacks skyrocketing even higher in 2011. Numerous reports indicate that drone strikes have driven jihadi forces further east into the Punjabi heartland, including Karachi, where they are increasingly cooperating together and pose a growing danger to the Pakistani state. It has also increased the risk of suicide-bombers among the more than one million Pakistanis in the U.K., many with British passports able to travel freely to the U.S., whom David Cameron reported in Wikileaks cables were "radicalized" by the U.S. invasion of Iraq and have been presumably even more upset by growing U.S. murder of Pakistanis since.

-- A growing nuclear threat: U.S. counterterror drone strikes have contributed to 59 percent of the Pakistani people -- over 110 million people -- regarding the U.S. as their "enemy." While U.S. leaders continue to cavalierly disregard Pakistani public opinion, former U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson reported in the Wikileaks cables that because of the public's hatred of the U.S., the Pakistani government has refused to cooperate with the U.S. on safeguarding its nuclear materials. U.S. ignoring Pakistani public opinion has thus helped create the single greatest threat to U.S. national security today. "Despite its political instability, Pakistan ... has the world’s fastest-growing nuclear stockpile," the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists recently reported. And it is considered one of the most insecure by nuclear experts. Former Senator Sam Nunn, who heads the Nuclear Threat Initiative, has said that "we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe" in Pakistan. 

U.S. policy has so angered the Pakistani military that the possibility of a pro-jihadi military coup is openly discussed in the N.Y. Times and in a new book by Bruce Riedel, who coordinated Obama's fall 2009 Afghan policy review and worked at the CIA when the Ronald Reagan armed Osama Bin Laden and supported Muslim extremist General Zia ul-Haq during the 1980s, the key U.S. foreign policy mistake leading to 9/11. Riedel's book describes in chilling detail precisely the "all-too-inevitable"disaster that current U.S. counterterrorism strategy could lead to. He writes that the "simplest way a jihadist Pakistan would emerge would be another military coup led by a general who shares the the worldview of Zia ul-Haq. A new Islamic Emirate of Pakistan ... would take control of the nuclear arsenal." Aligned with al Qaeda and armed with nuclear weapons, such a state would be a nightmare. 

And, as he notes, there is precious little the U.S. could do in the event of such a coup: "U.S options to change the regime by means of a coup or assisting dissidents ... would be limited. The United States is so unpopular in Pakistan today that its endorsement of a politician is a kiss of death." And if the U.S. tried to invade,he writes, "the Pakistanis would of course use their nuclear weapons to defend themselves ... an invasion would be a mission from hell. There are no good choices." He also explores the possibility of another Mumbai-like attack on India from Pakistan, concluding that "sooner or later a Pakistan-based terror attack on India is going to lead to Armageddon."

Nothing illustrates the incoherence of U.S.-Pakistan policy more, however, than Riedel's next chapter. America's most oft-quoted expert on Pakistan and participant in U.S. policy-making actually proposes expanding the very policies -- drone strikes, pressure on border areas and attacks within Pakistan that have made a military coup an "all-too-possible nightmare scenario." His most striking proposal is that "Washington could specifically target ISI officers (by) taking action against their individual and corporate financial holdings." It is difficult to imagine any single action more likely to provoke the very coup that Riedel properly warns against. King's College professor Anatol Lieven has correctly written that "any US action that endangered the stability of the Pakistani government would be insane. Nukes could fall into the hands of terrorists, along with huge quantities of conventional arms." Yet Riedel proposes, and the U.S. government is today conducting, precisely such "insane" policies, making the prospect of an anti-U.S. military coup ever more likely!

"Counterterrorism" Harms U.S. National Security More Than "Terrorism 

Although most Americans opposed postwar "communism," by the late 1950s they had concluded that the "anti-communist" overreaction -- including Joe McCarthy, loyalty oaths, blacklists, the House Unamerican Activities Committee and FBI spying on Americans -- posed a far more immediate threat to American democracy. Similarly today, while no one can doubt that "terrorism" poses a threat, it is already clear that today's U.S. "counterterrorism" crusade poses a far greater danger both to U.S. national security and American values by exponentially increasing those committed to murdering Americans.

The best way for the U.S. to fight terror in Pakistan is to end its drone strikes and violations of Pakistani sovereignty, and focus on effective economic and humanitarian aid. Perhaps then public hatred of the U.S. will be sufficiently reduced so as to allow for collaborative police work that targets terrorists effectively, and safeguards nuclear weapons. 

A second priority for U.S. policy is to promote the Pakistani military's stated desire, according to former U.S. Ambassador Patterson, for "deterrence, dialogue and development" toward its enemies. The Pakistanis, unlike the U.S., will have to live with their adversaries for the rest of time. They should be supported in their efforts to reach accommodations with them. 

A third priority would be to realize that effective economic aid, e.g. bringing a reliable supply of electricity to the tens of millions of Pakistanis who lack it, will advance U.S. interests -- including cooperation on nuclear materials -- far more than drone strikes. The Pakistan Tribune has reported that Pakistan Prime Minister Gilani believes that "America should also help Pakistan in addressing its problems, particularly the prevailing issue of loadshedding. He said the government was working on a war footing to resolve the issue of loadshedding ... The prime minister also said he had discussed with the US leadership the growing resentment against the local people due to rapid drone attacks on Pakistani territory." 

And a fourth priority, of course, would be to accelerate the U.S. withdrawal from "sideshow" Afghanistan.

At present, however, U.S. "counterterror policy" is clearly on a collision course with reality. It can only be hoped that when U.S. leaders are finally forced to acknowledge the moral and strategic bankruptcy of their counterterrorism policy that the damage they have done will not be irreversible.